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PRIVATE LAW
of redhibition to cases where the declaration is made with re-
spect to specific goods identified otherwise than by their quality.
This would mean that when the seller contracts to deliver goods
of a stated quality, the delivery of goods of a different quality
would constitute a breach of contract. This rule would be largely
free of doubt, easy to apply, and understandable to the parties.
In short, the decision in the instant case is counted as desirable
although difficult to square with the case of the cotton oil cake.
In Williams v. Daste,4 the court gave judgment to the seller
of a duplex subject to redhibitory vices for the excess of rentals
collected by the buyer on the rented portion of the structure over
the expenses of the sale and those for the preservation of the
thing. Civil Code article 2531 was cited in support. This article
recognizes inferentially that the buyer in such a case owes the
fruits of the thing to the seller. The buyer's own use of the thing
is offset by the seller's use of the price. 5
Since what purports to be an act of sale may be sustained, if
in proper form, as an act of donation, 6 it should follow that the
failure of an act of sale to state a price would not prevent it
from being translative of the property described in it. This view
was taken by the Supreme Court in a well-reasoned opinion in
Bolding v. Eason Oil Co.7 The court also held that the validity
of the act was not affected by its failure to reflect that the agent
who acted for the purchaser had a written power of attorney.
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If a landlord secures a judgment for rent to the end of the
term of the lease, the right of occupancy under the lease con-
tinues in the lessee. It is a valuable right which is subject to
seizure by the landlord or by any other judgment creditor and
can be sold independently of the lease. In this event the pur-
chaser does not become obligated to pay the rent stipulated in
4. 181 So. 2d 247 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
5. 24 LAURENT, PRINCIPES DE DROIT CIVIL 343 (1877); Farmer v. Fisk, 9
Rob. 351 (La. 1844) ; Rousseau & Co., Inc. v. Dolese, 8 La. App. 785 (1928).
6. McWilliams v. McWilliams, 39 La. Ann. 924, 3 So. 62 (1887).
7. 248 La. 269, 178 So. 2d 246 (1965).
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the lease; he becomes the owner of the right of occupancy in
return for the amount of his bid. Extinction of the right of
occupancy by confusion results when the landlord acquires the
right of occupancy but not so when the right of occupancy is
bought by another. In Hollier v. Boustany,l after the landlord
had secured a judgment for rent to the end of the term, a judg-
ment creditor of the lessee seized the latter's right of occupancy
and became the purchaser at its sale. It was held, however, that
he took nothing by his purchase inasmuch as two days before
he secured judgment against the lessee, the latter and the land-
lord had entered into an agreement that operated as a surrender
of the right of occupancy in satisfaction of the landlord's judg-
ment. It was said that the discharge of the tenant's obligation
to pay rent constituted a voluntary remission by the landlord
supported by Civil Code article 2199. Since a voluntary remis-
sion is gratuitous the view expressed might be taken as indi-
cating that the tenant's release of the right of occupancy was
also gratuitous. This was the position taken by the purchaser
who was relying on Civil Code articles 1970 and 1984.2 Never-
theless, the opinion makes it clear that the landlord's right to
enforce the judgment was discharged in consequence of the
lessee's surrender of the right of occupancy with the result that
the surrender was onerous, not gratuitous.
By statute, an assumption of responsibility by a lessee for
the condition of the leased premises is effective to relieve the
owner of responsibility to third persons on the premises subject
to certain qualifications. It has been held with good reason that
the assumption is effective only with respect to those parts of
the leased premises that are subject to control by the lessee
rather than the lessor. In Gebbia v. City of New Orleans,8 the
court held against the owner-lessor, the City of New Orleans,
in view of the fact that the city had retained control over a
ladies rest room in the Municipal Auditorium, where the injury
occurred.
1. 180 So. 2d 591 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965). Writ refused.
2. See also LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1980 (1870).
3. 181 So. 2d 292 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965), reversed on question of wife's
capacity to sue on behalf of community in 249 La. 409, 187 So. 2d 423 (1966).
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